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GOOD SELVES AND JUST WARS
JOHN

E. COONS*

It is impossible to live in peace with people one believes to be
damned ....
-Jean-Jacques Rousseau
INTRODUCTION

Rousseau means that my neighbor is my enemy, if (1) my
own version of the true and the good is necessary to salvation;
and (2) he or she is an unbeliever.'
The idea that persons are saved or damned by the truth of
their beliefs and the correctness of their deeds has counted in
human affairs at least since Moses gave the idolaters what he
thought they deserved. It surprises me, then, that commentators
on today's "clash of civilizations" have so little to say about those
theories of individual perfection, whether natural or supernatural, that are specific to the three principal combatants-Secularism, Judeo-Christianity, and Islam. Certainly, Rousseau would
have asked whether, in their contemporary forms, each or any of
these dominating world views, or their branches, allows any hope
2
for those who profess either of the other two. While they persist
in their evident errors, are my misguided neighbors condemned
to forfeit the human ideal? Or, is there room in my own creed
for the proposition that, somehow, all three of us have fullest
access to the highest sort of perfection?
* Robert L. Bridges Professor of Law, Emeritus, School of Law (Boalt
Hall), University of California, Berkeley. J.D., Northwestern University School
of Law; B.A., University of Minnesota, Duluth.
1. The passage continues: "[T]o love them would be to hate God who
punishes them: it is absolutely necessary either to convert or to torment thei."

JEAN-JAcQUES RoussEAu, On Social Contract, in RoussEAu's POLITICAL WRITINGS

172 (Julia Conaway Bondanella trans., 1988). Rousseau's specific villain in this
passage is his version of Roman Christianity; for reasons set out in the text
below, I label this interpretation "gnostic." See infra text accompanying notes
9-18.
2. Rousseau observed that, in his own day, religious aggression was "less
apparent among the Moslems." RoussEAu, supra note 1, at 168. Further,

"Mohammed had very sound views ... but the division began again . .. espe-

cially in the sect of Ali." Id. Rousseau did not link the degrees of religious
xenophobia to any specific Islamic conceptions of the conditions of salvation.
Id.
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Shortly, I will identify certain plausible premises about God
and human nature that would justify such an irenic concept.
Together they would constitute not only a theory of the self but
also of the two distinct categories of good that are unique to the
human person. I will argue that belief in this cluster of premises
about the self and human goods is a response-perhaps the only
one-to Rousseau's mournful assessment of relations between
the saved and damned. We can respect his warning while
rejecting any solution, including his own, that would either relativize what is truth and correct conduct or weaken our duty to
seek them. Given these premises the short, sufficient (and I
think true) answer to Rousseau comes in this form: false ideas do
not in themselves diminish anyone's goodness, nor can we know
from beliefs, or even conduct, who is damned and saved. Any
perception of our neighbor's impending damnation, thus, disappears as a justification for our aggression, and we can dispose of
Rousseau's problem without giving up on the true and the good,
as Rousseau chose to do.' Allow me a half dozen difficult
paragraphs to lay the ground and the vocabulary for that claim.
I.

THE SELF AND THE GOOD

I begin with two propositions about the self and the two distinct goods that are its object. Proposition 1: the self is best
understood as the capacity of the whole person freely to shoulder
or shirk the one responsibility that is evident to all rational
humans-namely, the duty to seek truth and correct conduct.
Proposition 2: when the self commits to this search, it realizes its
own excellence, regardless of honest mistakes of belief or behavior; fallibility is no threat to its perfection. This self-fulfillment I
call "first good"4 or, simply, goodness. In By Nature Equal, Patrick
Brennan and I argued that it is the one secure opportunity of
every human person.5 Later, I suggest an implication of this
belief for our relation to Islam.
There are, of course, many goods beside "first good" (or
goodness). Some of these we share with the animals or even with
all forms of being, while others are unique to humans. As with
the goodness of the self, those goods that are special to humanity
3. This is my interpretation of Rousseau's elevation of the General Will.
It might be challenged by the red-blooded relativist, if such there be. See Amy
GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 19-28 (Princeton University Press 1999)

(1987).
4.
I first used this term in John E. Coons, A Grammar of the Self, FIRST
THINGS, Jan. 2003, at 37.
5. See JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, By NATURE EQUAL: THE
ANATOMY OF A WESTERN INSIGHT (1999).
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are moral in character and presuppose freedom. The manner of
their being is metaphysically odd. They consist in correct possibilities that might be made actual by the thought, choice, and
conduct of individuals; it is our duty to try to identify and realize
them. These correct possibilities, in some cases, are very specific:
I should rescue this child, if I can. Or they may be very general:
by education and practice, I should constantly try to strengthen
my own intellectual power to discern the right course.
The actual content of the correct possibilities-the object of
our specific judgments-changes with the circumstances; for
example, the child gets rescued by another person and my
responsibility ceases. This inevitable flux of things makes goods
of this second sort potentially infinite in number. Further, their
realization is contingent; regardless of best efforts, we cannot
guarantee that we will achieve, or even recognize, the correct
result, either for ourselves or others. Finally, when we do realize
such a good, it remains vulnerable to change. I use the term
"second goods" for all these important and real (but fickle) possibilities of truth and correct conduct. They are quite distinct
from first good, or goodness, which is the perfection that is specific to the self and which is accomplished simply by the sews
free submission to the duty to seek second good; unlike second
good, goodness remains invulnerable to all but the self's own
6
choice to abandon this responsibility to seek.
I need yet a third word for all those aspects of the person
that together determine and limit his or her practical ability to
discover and realize second good in specific cases. It will be the
task of this word to denote the present agglomeration of
whatever in me is contingent, whether my thoughts, body, memories, perceptions, or relations with others. For this aggregation
of mutable properties, I prefer the term "persona," intending it
to mean the whole of one's powers (and their limitations) other
than that unique capacity for goodness which is the self. The persona thus constitutes the tools that are available at any given
moment to one who is in search of correct possibilities; it is the
instrument that the responsible self assigns to seek and attempt
second good. 7
6. Note that the perfection of the self occurs simply in its commitment to
seek and not in any transformation of what is wrong conduct into right. The
latter view-that right intention turns the moral frog into a prince-seems
implied in JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J., GOODNESS AND RIGHTNESS IN TiioMAS AQUINAS'S SuMMA THEOLOGIAE (1992), which provides an ample bibliography of this
school.
7. For a fuller elaboration of this usage-of person, self, and personasee Coons, supra note 4.
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Because all these resources that make up the persona differ
greatly from person to person, we are unequal in our access to
truth and correctness. This inequality has consequences in the
search for "second goods." For example, regarding the specific
requirements of justice, in various circumstances, some of us,
and not others, will mistake those occasions when the taking of
human life is permissible. But this inequality in our individual
powers of discernment is irrelevant to the achievement of "first
good," for the self wins its own goodness simply by committing.
That is, it sets the resources of its imperfect persona-such as
they are-in diligent quest of justice and truth, however elusive
these prove to be to this particular person in this particular case.
The individual freedom to commit is common to all rational persons; it ensures a natural equality in our access to goodness,
though clearly not in our ability to discover and realize specific
second goods.
This, then, is the core idea and the premises on which it
rests. Now again, the question: If one were to believe this proposition about the equality of our access to goodness, and I do,
would it address Rousseau's problem? Would it affect one's treatment of others, including choices of war and peace? I claim this
much: the possibility of empathy for the other is deeply affected
by the operating assumption that one adopts about the other's
capacity for goodness. That assumption, whatever it is, becomes
part of the moral chemistry of each practical encounter. A disposition to doubt the other's potential for first good-his capacity
for simple goodness-undermines the shared dignity of persons
and even nations, as they struggle to resolve their inevitable conflicts. Both rationality and charity are the worse for that doubt.
In this respect, I cannot improve on Rousseau's insight, and the
current stare-down between Islam and the West can be attributed
in part to reciprocal images of damnation-spiritual and material-playing themselves out in politics. Today, that cosmic faceoff provides the deadliest opportunity for this subtle provocation
that poisons human affairs.
My conclusion is moderately hopeful. Over time, it is conceivable that these disabling interpretations of one another's
potential for goodness can be abandoned without threat to basic
beliefs of mainline Christians and Muslims (the secular creed, we
will see, is less promising). Without risk of heresy, each may be
able to affirm the claim that every human has plenary access to
self-perfection (natural and supernatural); such an agreement
would deserve propagation. Even universal consensus on the
point would not guarantee continual peace; agreement about
our common capacity for goodness would not determine the
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proper disposition of the Golan Heights. But deliverance from
Rousseau's specific threat would help to limit armed conflict to
that elusive occasion known as 'just war." Neither Islam nor the
West yet seems fully conscious of the grave consequences of
denying the highest human achievement to honest, striving persons who get wrong answers.
II.

THE GNOSTIC TEMPTATION

Though the more radical elements of Islam may be deaf to
arguments that might heal and bind, fellowship with the Muslimin-the-street is a legitimate, if long-range, hope for the West.
Moral and intellectual schemes abound that could accelerate its
coming. Each of these proposals begins with a somewhat different diagnosis of our mutual and enduring discontent.' The
problem can seem to lie with them or us. It is our arrogance or
their envy; it is their theology or our materialism; it is their
repression of women or our repression of nothing at all. Doubtless it is all these and more, but I wonder that our reciprocal
phobias may issue, in telling measure, from a blind spot that we
and the Muslims share in varying degree with the rest of the race.
I hesitate to label this imperfection "natural"; for, in principle, it
may be overcome and, in practice, it appears to be shrinking, at
least among religious believers. It consists, I think, in a certain
form of Gnosticism-that ancient and fuzzy term that I will now
refocus for our immediate purpose.'
For me, the gnostic is that person, fingered by Rousseau,
who presumes a link between correct knowledge and self-perfection. Like most of us, the gnostic believes that he knows some
particular set of truths, descriptive and/or moral. What sets him
apart is his belief that the knowledge of his specific truths is
important or even necessary to the achievement of the highest
state of being that is possible to the human individual. Gnostics
do not constitute a harmonious whole-anything but. Daily we
8. The report of the 9/11 Commission gives an excellent theological, cultural, economic, and historic description of the problem. See NAT'I COMM'N ON
TERRORIST ATiAcKs UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 48-55
(2004). Even its account of the theological background, however, is silent on
Rousseau's warning of the implications of human contempt for those damned
by their erroneous convictions.

9. Scholars of Antiquity will squirm; however, the parochial phenomenon
that they label "Gnostic" constituted but one historical example of the enduring
tendency to understand human perfection as, first of all, an intellectual state.
See generally ELAINE PAGELS, THE GNOSTIC GOSPELS (1979) (comparing mainstream orthodox Christianity with Gnosticism). The uncapitalized form of the
word is extremely useful to identify the outlook common to schools of moral
thought that otherwise appear to share nothing.
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see them strongly disagree regarding two things: (1) the content
of the precious knowledge; and (2) the nature of the personal
excellence for which this knowledge is the ideal instrument.
Conceptions of what it is to be self-fulfilled (states of being that
are analogous to my "first good" or goodness) can be either natural, supernatural, ambiguous, or all three; the same holds for the
knowledge that is necessary to secure that highest state. Thus,
for example, a religious gnostic may deem his particular theological insight essential to a perfection that, when achieved by any
person, consists specifically in his justification and eternal salvation.'0 The secular gnostic, by contrast, may recognize a very different form of self-perfection, one to which any belief in God is a
serious impediment.1 1 But all gnostics agree on this: no matter
how one conceives this state of excellence, getting wrong information is an impediment to its realization.
I will comment first on those gnostic conceptions of excellence that are exclusively secular. These tend to share an understanding of the self that is purely materialistic. We are "nothing
but" our bodies, and mental activity proceeds essentially in the
manner of a computer. For such believers, the "gnosis" consists
in one's grasping this deterministic reality. Given this insight,
individual perfection may then be conceived simply as a state of
maximized neural pleasure; or this sensual aspiration may be
integrated with, and often is subordinated to, a specifically intellectual component of the human experience. The latter outlook
is typical in the culture of our schools and colleges where an individual's fulfillment often is taken to consist essentially in secular
enlightenment advanced to the limit of one's natural capacity.
Academics of this mind may represent the purest of all gnostic
types, favoring Einstein T-shirts and worshipping an intellect that
10. On the primacy of intellect and right answers in Calvin's corpus, see
WiHLA~mJ. BouwsmA, JOHN CALVIN 98-109 (1988). According to KEENAN, supra
note 6, at 53-56, Aquinas was more wavering than Calvin and on his way toward
a non-gnostic finale. Hc never reached it. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, I-II, q. 9, art. 6, obj. 3 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947).
11. See, e.g.,JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 90-91 (1992)
("When we encounter people who claim to believe such things, we may envy
them the comfort and security they claim to derive from these beliefs, but at
bottom we remain convinced that either they have not heard the news or they
are in the grip of faith."). See alsoJOSEPHVINING, THE SONG SPARROW AND THE
CHILD 9 (2004) ("Biology has demonstrated that there is no metaphysical entity
hidden behind the word 'life' . . . .") (quoting Nobelist Francois Jacob).
Regarding theories of morality, Jean-Pierre Changeux (another Nobelist)
assures us that "[t] ogether they make up a virtual symphony of blindness ....
Id. at 53.
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is strictly empirical. Single-mindedly, they struggle to raise the
academic performance of unpromising students, exulting at each
improbable success and despairing over the intellectual underachiever whose ignorance forfeits his own highest possibility.
Worse, if our gnostic academic cares about human equality,
as is common, she is dismayed at the inevitable hierarchy of persons that is entailed in her own world view; for her, the immense
natural differences in intellectual power among1 2 her students
In her eyes,
represent the limits of their attainable perfection.
are
brightest
the
brain;
the
in
the real human victory occurs only
highthe
wields
that
one
the
is
mind"
the best, and the "beautiful
13
My late colleague, Bernard Wilest intellectual horsepower.
of the human condition "moral
aspect
this
call
to
liams, liked
4
the capacity for gnostic exceldistributing
randomly
By
luck."'
lence, it entails the death of human equality.
Meanwhile, far from California, on some sunny street in
Islamabad, a young Muslim reflects on the destiny of Westerners
like these secular friends of mine. He knows well the sacred
truths of belief and conduct that are necessary and sufficient for
salvation. He does not anticipate sharing paradise with infidel
Berkeley professors. These may, however, serve to remind him
that a prominent part of the Muslim's own saving knowledge
consists in the duty of concern for the salvation of those who are
15
endangered by wrong ideas. Paradoxically, he mirrors the missionary zeal of our typical Western academic; for each of them
longs to infuse what are the saving ideas in the world's wasted
minds. Generously, the secularist and the Muslim yearn to
render one another knowing and thus perfectible-each on his
own gnostic terms.
12. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, The Idea of Equality, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF
230, 234-39 (1973).
13. The recent Holl-wood film of this title is a celebration of this secular
mystique of intellect-as-perfection. The brain of the film's protagonist is,
indeed, high octane; but to adjudge the mind that it served "beautiful" is, in my
view, a case of serious mislabeling.
14. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 35, 36 (Daniel Statman
ed., SUNY Press 1993).
15. See KORAN 31 (N.J. Dawood trans., Penguin Books 1956) ("Therefore
give warning. Your duty is only to warn them .... As for those who turn their
backs and disbelieve, Allah will inflict on them the supreme chastisement."); see
also id. at 317 ("Tell the unbelievers that if they mend their ways their past shall
be forgiven; but if they persist in sin, let them reflect upon the fate of their
forefathers. Make war on them until idolatry is no more and Allah's religion
reigns supreme."). Before plunging into the Koran, I recommend Tolstoy's
classic fictional interpretation of Muslim worldviews. LEO TOLsTOY, Hadji
Murad, in GREAT SHORT WORKS OF LEO TOLSTOY 547 (Louise Maude & Aylmer
Maude trans., Harper & Row 1967).
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The gallery of religious gnostic creeds is considerable. I cannot identify every specimen. It is sufficient to note those modalities of Christianity whose beliefs limit the hope for goodness,
either of the Muslim or of the secular-minded person. Consider
this line from Aquinas: "T] he will that abides by that erring reason is evil [in a certain case]; since this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know."' 6 Let me
stress that Aquinas was the most moderate of gnostics, clearly
preferring to excuse and save the ignorant and the blundering
where possible. But one must recognize in him this enduring
tendency, shared by a substantial number of other Christians, to
suppose that either natural perfection or eternal salvation, or
both, turns upon one's holding correct beliefs and/or doing correct deeds.' 7 Half consciously such Christians ratify Samuel
Johnson's notion of a hell paved with good intentions. Paradise,
they insist, depends on right answers; anyone who misjudges the
evil of polygamy, assisted suicide, or an unjust war faces grievous
consequences.
Christians who insist in this way that correctness is a condition of goodness are, in my terms, gnostics. But note that, in
respect of their own personal prospects, this is a neutral observation; so far as I am concerned, the honest gnostic (of every
stripe) is as salvageable as the rest of us blunderers. God has
shown him, and all of us, the responsibility to seek, leaving him
free either to accept or evade it. I do wish he would get the right
answer about who is good, but, if he is truly seeking, the gnostic
paradoxically achieves goodness in the very manner that he is
unable to recognize as effectual for his opponent.
III.

COSTS

OF GNOSTICISM

Now consider more specifically the practical effect of supposing in this way that the other's access to goodness is impeded
by incurable ignorance. To the extent that our trio of Gnosticsthe godless, the Christian, and the Muslim-reciprocally devalue
one another for honest mistakes of belief and behavior, they ratify General Sheridan's notorious assessment of the American
16.
17.

See AQuINAS, supra note 10, q. 19, art. 6; see also KEENAN, supra note 6.
An oblique window on modern attitudes among various Christian

churches is the excellent volume SHARING THE BOOK: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES
ON THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF PROSELYrISM (John Witte, Jr. & Richard C.
Mar-

tin eds., Orbis Books 1999). The most pointed among its essays is Jozef
Tomko's Missionary Challenges to the Theory of Salvation. Id. at 174. For one who
was weaned on "The Jesuit Relations" and who saved nickels to "save" pagan
babies, the authors of the other essays in this book show surprisingly little inter-

est in eschatology.
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Indian."8 We can almost substitute Usama bin Laden for Sheridan. To be sure, the Wahabi fanatic would deny that dead Christians are good; but the observation that live ones are bad would
be self-evident.
And, if the American Indian and I were really bad, what
would follow? I fear that the practical policies favored by Sheridan and al Qaeda would make a certain sense. If my blundering
conduct or false belief entails my self-corruption, why should anyone accord me the deference due the man who has been made
good by grasping the right ideas? Now, just how far one should
go in disadvantaging any specific bad man may be a matter for
casuistry and prudence, and mercy is allowed. But in principle,
the personal state of any of us would seem highly relevant to the
distribution of rewards and burdens. Rousseau got this much
right. Whether in war or peace, unless some non-gnostic and
sovereign principle enters to mediate our judgments, any man's
shortfall in belief or conduct-hence, in his goodness-will bear
upon the treatment due him. For better or worse, the untethered notion that there is a roster of the damned who are identified by their deeds or ideas is potentially lethal. Plausibly, the
bad X deserves to be a dead X.
Again, this is not a problem peculiar to those gnostics who
also happen to be either Muslim fanatics or crackpot American
generals. Marxists, liberals, and Christians have all been known
to discover persons whose failure to know what is true and good
merits disadvantage. The appropriate sanction need not be governmental or military and can be subtle indeed. In American
society, the correct secular liberal denounces and publicly shuns
the fundamentalist Christian believer, who often returns the
compliment. Even when chance throws them on the same side
of some policy, theyomanage to devalue one another as embodiments of moral failure. The consequences for each and for society of this mutual contempt are not trivial. And these effects get
extended as secular and Christian gnostics turn independently to
assess the Muslim; though human, this barbarian is, by defini9
To the secular, this is an easy infertion, an inferior specimen.
ence from the Muslim's supposed ignorance and fear of
To be fair, the remark is only "attributed." OXFORD DIcrIONARY OF
499 (2d ed. 1955).
19. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIc THREAT: MYTH OR REALITY? 51 (3d ed.
1999) ("Muslims did not have to look far to find Europeans whose statements
reinforced their fears; said one English author: 'The luxuriant religions of Asia
shrivel into dry sticks when brought into contact with the icy realities of Western sciences."').
18.

QUOTATIONS
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modernist culture;2" for the gnostic Christian the dismal assessment tends to be more specifically theological. 2 ' Meanwhile,
returning these volleys, the Muslim gnostic sees them both as
losers.2 2 Though the process is subtle and almost pre-conscious,
for all three believers, their exclusivist creeds can be predisposing when it comes time to decide between war and peace. It is
easier to bomb the damned.
IV.

THE IRENIC VERSES

This perceptual problem did not begin with our recent
rediscovery of Islam. The West has long recognized the gnostic
syndrome as a challenge to a peaceful pluralist order and has
responded at the level of proverbs, rules of thumb, and policies
of avoidance. One of its settled conventions for defusing the
incendiary question about goodness is to "treat each person as an
individual." Judgments are to be made one by one. To a point
this is a useful rule. Without denying the reality of distinctions in
perfection that hold among us, it encourages our better angels to
focus upon specific facts about a person that truly ought to count
for or against goodness. In this way, some characteristics get
properly marginalized. For example, race does not seem to bear,
hence we reject it along with gender which (pace Aristotle)
seems irrelevant to self-perfection.
But, soon we run out of such manifestly neutral categories
and can be driven once again to personify the evils of our enemies' beliefs and practices. Even his beliefs about descriptive
matters such as the Big Bang or the evolution of species can seem
to implicate such a believer's goodness.2 3 And whenever a fac20.

Id. at 285-86,

21. I hesitate out of ignorance. Even in the era of the Spanish Inquisition, the mind of Europe seems conflicted about the-Muslim's access to God.

See HENRY KAMEN, THE SPANISH INQUISITION 1-7 (1998). And the Vatican's
sev-

eral modern pronouncements on Catholic-Muslim relations would seem
to
remove the issue at the official level. SeeJACQUES JOMIER, THE BIBLE
AND THE

QUR'AN (Edward P. Abez trans., 2002) (detailing the differences between Christian Scripture and Islamic texts while acknowledging that the Catholic Church's
official position focuses on their mutual worship of the same God).
22. See generally Donna E. Artz, The Treatment of Religious Dissidents Under
Classical and Contemporary Islamic Law, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 387 (John Witte, Jr. & Johan
D. van der
Vyver eds., 1996). At least for amateurs like the author, this essay is a rich, clear
source with which to start before proceeding to BERNARD LEWIS,
THE MIDDLE
EAST: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAST 2000 YEARS (1995) and other
Lewis works.

23. For the six-day creationist this may seem obvious. But note that for
the determinist himself, it has virtually the same effect by rendering moral
"goodness" an illusion but leaving him, nonetheless, with
the anomalous virtue
of being rid of "prejudices." His is a noble "act of self-discipline . .. by which
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tual claim of this sort is offered as the premise for conduct, the
stakes tend to rise. Convictions regarding the humanity of the
fetus come to mind; if you should propose to practice the evil
that your particular factual belief about the unborn would logically allow, my sour judgment of you at the deepest level may
seem confirmed. Even though, in the end, I decide to tolerate
your favorite sins and false beliefs, my bleak opinion of you-qua
you-is hard to shake. If a lightning bolt were to deliver the justice you deserve, I would consider my opinion conveniently vindicated. Thus, for the gnostic to treat another human as an
individual does not necessarily eliminate, and can even
encourage, conflict.
A second convention urges us to distinguish persons from
their acts. This also is good advice. John Paul II invokes it when
4
he defends the integrity of ethics;" an action can be truly wrong
regardless of the actor's benign state of mind. Unfortunately, to
distinguish person from act does not settle the question of
whether a deed that is truly evil necessarily affects the actor's own
goodness. One can accept both the person/act distinction and
the objectivity of ethics without deciding whether a man or
woman can be self-perfecting when he or she honestly mistakes
incorrect for correct acts. The gnostic, in short, can still believe
that the earnest but invincibly ignorant actor is personally cor.25
rupted (or, at best, unperfected)
In a pluralist social context discord among gnostics obviously presents a special challenge to the pursuit of community.
In modern times the West has responded with a third and
broader strategy that is intended to keep the contentious question of individual goodness below the level of collective conBoth formally and informally, society has
sciousness.
26
common institutions.
discouraged religious speech within our
2
The "naked public square," ' in considerable degree, has been
understood and accepted as a strategy for muzzling discussion;
we are to remain mute about both the religious criteria of goodone tries to eliminate . . . all remaining traces of transcendence . . . ." JEANAND
PIERRE CHANGEUX & ALAIN CONNES, CONVERSATIONS ON MIND, MATrER

MATHEMATIcS 25 (M.B. DeBevoise ed. & trans., 1995).
24. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR, Nos. 62-63 (J. Michael
Miller ed., Our Sunday Visitor Publishing Division 1996) (1992).
25. Unfortunately, Veritatis Splendor can itself be easily misunderstood this
way. See id. No. 78. For a strong, clear pre-Vatican II statement of the gnostic
378-79
position, see ETIENNE GILSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. BONAvENTURE
(1965).
GUT26. See STEPHEN MACEDO, DIvERsrry AND DISTRUST 28-43 (2000);
MANN, supra note 3.
27. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1986).
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ness and the competing interpretations of the sort of person
these imply. This strategy of silence about the truly good human
being has, however, both overdetermined and underdetermined
its own pacific objective. To begin, the policy excludes a great
deal of speech that is socially benign. Most of the religious ideology of goodness that gets censored is wholly irenic and socially
inclusive; indeed, it is both deeply communitarian and anything
but gnostic.28
On the other hand, this muzzling of ideas encourages all the
forms of gnostic hierarchy that compete with religion. By excluding religious discourse from the public arena society has ensured
a virtual monopoly for the secular gospels with their saving message that the highest state that is available to any individual is by
its nature purely empirical and sensational. Gone from the
debate are any invocations of an order of truly correct conduct
(or truths) issuing from an authentic authority to which (or
whom) a responsible self might cleave and commit. If one is
even permitted to speak of an order of "good" acts, these must be
defined in terms of the desires of individuals. Talk of transcendence is out of bounds, leaving no reason other than prudence
to honor a purely artificial social contract, even if such a thing
could obtain under these intellectual conditions. The notion of
a collective good is transmogrified, becoming at best the sum of
our unrealized private hankerings. What I have called "second
good" becomes whatever I happen to will. And even the "I" who
is to do this act of willing loses its identity as a locus of responsibility. Paradoxically, this secular dominance is itself anything but
neutral, constituting a strong claim of precedence among possible human ends. For example, it implies the puerility of every
individual who holds a religious worldview; for, to the secular
gnostic, personal goodness consists exclusively in rationality, but
the religious believer's rationality is already compromised.
Of course, Rousseau and our contemporary censors have
their point. History attests that, when introduced into common
affairs, creeds that flaunt the moral superiority of their members
tend to generate heat more than light. But the current notion of
a strictly secular excellence (with an academic elect) is no exception to this rule; so far this creed has proved not only ineffectual
toward its goal of social peace but very costly to both free speech
and free religion. In light of this continuing damage, the gag
rule increasingly appears narrow and antiquarian (and this not
less for its vogue in the academy). In the quest for community
28. See CHARLEs L. GLENN, THE AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT
AND
FAITH BASED SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL AGENCIES 62-73 (2000).
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today, it is not the secular censor, but the competing religious
faiths, that vector toward a shared and irenic orthodoxy; they
converge toward the common insight that God will save those
who are invincibly ignorant but who do the best they can with
9
Now, to the extent that agreement
what they have been given.
could be reached on this proposition, our disputes over the content of truth and right conduct (even those over our purely material interests) would more likely remain rational and non-violent.
It is harder to bomb people who just might be good.
V.

CLEARING BRUSH

Renunciation of the gnostic impulse does not come free of
cost, but the pain should not be exaggerated. In order to believe
in the equality of our access to goodness, one real surrenderand one only-is required. Here is that concession put in its
most aggressive form: given certain assumptions about the mind
of Mohammed Atta, this terrorist murderer of innocents may
have secured his own goodness simply by committing to seek and
do the will of Allah as best the diligent Mr. Atta could grasp that
will. If you can accept this as a possibility, proceed; the rest of
the news is good.
It includes, first, the strict preservation of the truth of "second good" and the traditional conceptions of virtue. The
authoritative order of conduct remains intact; no concession is
required of any believer either as to its reality or the specific content he ascribes to it. Nor need he doubt the universality of the
obligation to seek these correct specifics of which he deems himself steward. In short, the moral status of Mr. Atta's hideous deed
by conceding the separate possibility of his own
is unaffected
30
goodness.
A second consolation: the fateful commitment for or against
responsibility is never transparent-even to the self that makes it.
The human faculty for self-delusion is notorious. It is an occult
talent that explains why even the Christian who insists upon sola
must seek his
fide (and himself bursts with faith) nevertheless
3
What seems the direct
own salvation "in fear and trembling."
experience of freely enlisting his own persona in the quest for
truth and right conduct can somehow be a deliberate snare laid
by the ego-an act of pride and insubordination. Hence, to
believe in mankind's plenary access to goodness does not make
life less scary. I suspect that this obscurity about one's own cho29.
30.
31.

See CooNs & BRENNAN, supra note 5, at 145-215.
Id. Contrast the ambiguity that is allowed by KEENAN, supra note 6.
Philippians2:12.
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sen orientation toward second good is necessary to our freedom,
and I report it-at least equivocally-as good news, but the implications multiply.
If I cannot be certain of the authenticity of my own commitment, I can scarcely penetrate Mr. Atta's-or yours. The belief
in self-perfection by the commitment to seek "second good,"
therefore, goes only this far: your natural equipment for goodness is by definition adequate and equal to mine. The integrity
of your actual choice remains a mystery.
Does this render our proposition plausible but wholly vapid?
How could belief in the capacity for a goodness that is opaque
affect how we address the prudential questions of our world? If I
must deal only with what I can see of you, what is the practical
point about your merely possible goodness? It is this: belief in
our common access to an inscrutable goodness denies us General Sheridan's breezy solution to our problems with the neighbors. So long as we can know them to be hopelessly evil, we can,
without further excuse, turn them into "good Indians." It is
when we concede the possibility and mystery of their goodness
that we become obliged to undertake a separate accounting of
justice. This perfectibility of theirs imposes upon us the responsibility for a moral calculus that includes and assesses every
rational consideration about my neighbor except his goodness.
And this responsibility is universal; it holds for every relationship
public and private.
I suppose one might acknowledge a second "loss" to the
regenerate gnostic. In making his concession, he declines Sheridan's vivid invitation to serve as the instrument of divine justice
here and now. Some might regret this. I intend no sarcasm; one
must respect the believer who cannot in conscience forsake what
he sees as truth and responsibility. But the die-hard gnostic
should in the long run prove rare. He has much to gain by conversion. Embrace of the mystery of a human goodness that is
available to all would constitute his liberation from what is a confounding distraction in the pursuit of right answers to practical
ethical questions; dealing fairly with a neighbor while convinced
of his moral inferiority is a cross like no other. For the sake of
sheer intelligibility in ethics one should avoid particular judgments of goodness wherever this is an honest possibility.
This rule has application to political life. To question the
goodness of persons is to encumber every step in the pursuit of
truth through free expression. Too often social habit encourages a cowardly reticence to face crucial issues lest we betray an
offensive and incendiary view of the other; we play possum, and
the market of ideas becomes the loser. What a blessing it would
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be, then, at last to find that there is in fact no personal offense to
be given! To accept the possibility of the goodness of a bungler
like me becomes your new liberty to name those ghastly errors of
mine without diminishing our common dignity. Indeed, true
respect for me requires both that you speak the truth about my
mistakes and at the same time do so without impugning my own
authenticity. When these two conditions are met, our real disagreement about what is right and just can coexist with the sporting chance of a deeper bond that will outlive the quarrel. Like
many Americans I have close friends with really rotten ideas. I
am confident of their possible goodness (the friends, not the
ideas). It does not follow that we will remain at peace, but, if we
must fight, the plausibility of their goodness will be my best hope
of our eventual reconciliation.
The achievement of a consensus supporting our universal
hope of goodness would not represent anybody's victory in the
"culture wars"; it entails no critique of pluralism. What it offers is
a moral minimalism that allows the ongoing brawl of ideas; what
it makes unacceptable is the stifling of that honorable free-for-all
in pursuit of an Ivy League decorum. Short of violence, expression is to be valued and strongly encouraged-even religious
expression.
And, as for violence itself, belief in our universal access to
goodness is its specific prophylactic. That belief authorizes the
pluralist society's one sustainable species of community-the
agape that celebrates the potential excellence of all persons even
amidst the "war" of ideas. Nothing in it disavows the desirability
of a "global ethic" or "common ethical code"-so long as it is the
correct one. But as we seek that grand accord regarding the true
and the right, let us here and now enjoy our universal access to
goodness-and stay alive even as brawling brothers.
VI.

WHO COULD BELIEVE THIS?

How open is Muslim doctrine and culture to the premise of
an equal opportunity God-one who saves those who do their
best, regardless of their errors? My amateur research suggests
the absence of any Islamic institution or person that would be
authoritative on the question. My own Muslim friends find the
idea plausible (and, I suspect, even banal). The professional
apologists who bear witness in the media assure us of the Muslim's highest esteem for Christian believers, seeming to imply a
positive answer to our question. Still, there remains a very forbidding literature of a militant Islam and a good deal of bloody
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history; both may be organically connected to the original revelation and its sufferance of the sword.3 2
Overall, my intuition suggests a broad and deep yearning
among Muslims for respect and for recognition as full-fledged
human persons who, at the same time, remain faithful believers.
For them a belief in equal access to goodness offers that very
possibility, for it exacts no surrender of anything beyond the particular belief (if such now obtains) that God reprobates souls like
me who just cannot get it right. When he hears the news that it is
precisely as a Christian that I believe in the Muslim's own plenary
access to goodness and to God, perhaps he will return the favor
and believe in mine. This modest conversion would be less than
a logical entailment; but it is more than a pious hope.
We cannot know until we test the possibility, and the first
two questions here may be who are "we," and are we prepared,
along with a critical mass of our neighbors, to accept the proposition? So far as the "we" is taken to identify the Christian world,
the prospect seems good. Vatican II and most of the encyclicals
of John Paul II justify optimism that Catholic doctrine will continue its modern commitment to the full moral dignity of the
authentic blunderer.3" It would be rash to predict the same consensus among Protestants, but I am inclined to hope. After all,
salvation by doing our best is moderate doctrine compared to the
flirtations with universal salvation that abound in the works of
foundational theologians like Karl Barth;3 4 I might add that
those diverse Protestants who populate my own life seem surprised that I would even raise the question.
32. The Koran itself is a rich source of concern. See, e.g., Traditional
Chapters 8 ("The Spoils"); 9 ("Repentance"); 83 ("The Unjust"), in KoRAN,
supra note 15. All bristle with injunctions of the following sort from Chapter 9:
"[M]ake war on the unbelievers and the hypocrites and deal rigorously with
them. Hell shall be their home: an evil fate." Id. at 328. Bernard Lewis sums
his own view that the Muslim jihad is a rather different phenomenon from the
crusades with their limited objectives:
The Muslim fihad in contrast as perceived as unlimited, as a religious
obligation that would continue until all the world had either adopted
the Muslim faith or submitted to Muslim rule. In the latter case, those
who professed what Muslims recognized as a revealed religion were
allowed to continue the practice of that religion, subject to the acceptance of certain fiscal and other disabilities. Those who did not, that is
to say idolaters and polytheists, were given the choice of conversion,
death or slavery.
LEwIs, supra note 22, at 233-34. One finds the irenic messages of our politicians hard to take seriously as informed judgments of the world confronting us.
33.
34.

See COONS & BRENNAN, supra note 5, at 209-10.
Id. at 185-90.
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Understandably, someone might ask: If, regardless of my
errors, I am saved by my free submission to the universal vocation
to seek, who needs the Church? In a certain sense the answer
is-nobody. No one's access to God is diminished or augmented
by the content either of belief or conduct but only by the quality
of his or her search.
So, exit the Church? No, and this for reasons that here I can
roughly profile, because they seem to me purest orthodoxy. The
Church is the world's primary mediator of truth and morals.
Now, whether the world will in fact progress in the realization of
"second good" is never certain. What is clear is that individually
we are supposed to value that progress and to seek it with every
instrument at hand-that is, the resources of our own persona.
And here stands the Church. It is the authority responsible to
discern and offer to each of us the specific content of the truths
and right conduct that will tend to the fulfillment of possible
human good; to this end it wields revelation, reason, and divine
marching orders.
Many will not grasp the Church's message. For some of us
this will be because we are busy satisfying ourselves; for others it
will be because they have honestly come to suppose truth to lie
where it does not. The latter, as authentic seekers, achieve "first
good" even as they botch "second good." Having failed with
these individuals, the Church, nonetheless, continues to preach,
because that is its commission: "Go forth and teach." And we
have every reason to hope that the world in fact will be the better
for it, though this has nothing specific to do with the salvation of
this or that person.
What of the sacraments? Are they inefficacious, because
they are not necessary to "first good?" Of course not. (I speak
here, I hope, as a Catholic, but that only underlines the point.)
The sacraments are exactly what they purport to be; hence they
constitute the most powerful possible intervention in our world.
They create real relationships, real authority, and real presence.
To know them is a great gift and a huge responsibility; but knowledge that this is so does not elevate my prospects for the beatific
vision above those of the camel driver. We are full brothers, all
the way down in our shared hope for salvation.
Finally, can this anti-gnostic perspective satisfy the Christian
emphasis on a divine grace that is freely dispensed? I think it
entails the understanding emphasized in the CatholicEncyclopedia:
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calling

for man's free response."
I can imagine no more thoroughly Christian enterprise than
a joint and formal representation by Protestant and Catholic
authorities to the following effect: (1) we continue in charity to
examine our deep and perhaps irresolvable differences with one
another-and all believers-regarding divine truth and right
conduct; (2) these differences, however profound, in no way
impede our joint and enthusiastic affirmation of the plenary
access to the saving love of God of every person who diligently
seeks the truth. Presented persistently and artfully to the Islamic
world as the reigning Christian consensus, this message carries
no obvious downside but only a profound potential for healing.
If we believe it, we should say so in common and with
enthusiasm.
We cannot, unfortunately, count on the collaboration of our
secular brethren who, on this issue, may find themselves tonguetied. Theirs is a gnosticism by its nature more obdurate and perhaps ineluctable. If our highest perfection lies this side of death,
it must be measured in things contingent; and these are often
the fruit of moral luck. Each of us has more or less of the crucial
properties of intellect, health, wealth, looks, and opportunities
by which to pursue the ephemera that the secular imperative
leaves us to choose for ourselves. Even if this vision somehow
could constitute one stable concept of "first good," the chances
for each person to realize it would vary dramatically; and, to be
plain, under present economic and social conditions, too many
Muslims outside the West have come off short in the lottery.
In any case, perfection by simple commitment is not a solution that seems available to our secular colleagues. They cannot
value the search for a real and authoritative order of second
goods, for no such order exists, and if it did, there would be no
free self to commit to it.36 To such a mind the believing Muslim
must ever appear as a deluded loser. Rev. Falwell and company
were not utterly wrong in blaming the terrorist impulse on this
sophisticated paganism of the West; for the Muslim clearly apprehends the contempt that it implies for him. The Islamic fanatic
35.

E.M. Burke, Grace, in 6 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 658, 658-72

(1967).
36.

Paradoxically, "[t]here is a denial that we exist.., and at the same

time a hostility to the utterance and the belief that we do exist .

. . ."

VINING,

supra note 11, at 26. Vining's book presents a treasure of "scientific" denials of
the self and of any order of right conduct. For one philosopher's effort to save
the extreme Darwinians from themselves, see WILLiAM HASKER, THF EMERCFNT
SELF 75-80 (1999).
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is not delivering ajustice that in fact is ordained by God, but he is
definitely getting even for the insult to Muslim (and human)
dignity.
I toast the honest secular gnostic; his access to salvation is
exactly my own. I judge only his premises and deeds, never the
state of his inscrutable self. Nevertheless, he represents a grave
problem for all of us, possibly the political problem of our time.
Over the century ahead it is his creed that will most systematically
imperil human community. The primary barrier to a moral rapprochement with Islam, indeed with the world at large, is not
those faiths that anchor confidently in a Father who embraces
every struggling bungler. If God wills to save those who seek
right answers, all of us can forego our battle with the damned.

